Melllvar

From a national security standpoint of the government, it absolutely does matter who has the data.

Looks like compatibility hacks for various websites.

Interventions - are deeper modifications to make sites compatible. Firefox may modify certain code used on these sites to enforce compatibility. Each compatibility modification links to the bug on Bugzilla@Mozilla; click on the link to look up information about the underlying issue.

User Agent Override - change the user agent of Firefox when connections to certain sites are made.

https://wiki.mozilla.org/Compatibility/UA_Override_&_Interventions_Testing

The value of the DNS is that we all use the same one. You can declare independence, but you’d lose out on that value.

That’s kind of the point.

Clementine originally forked from Amarok 1.4 because Amarok 2.0 changed too much.

Even the researcher who reported this doesn’t go as far as this headline.

“I am an admin, should I drop everything and fix this?”

Probably not.

The attack requires an active Man-in-the-Middle attacker that can intercept and modify the connection’s traffic at the TCP/IP layer. Additionally, we require the negotiation of either ChaCha20-Poly1305, or any CBC cipher in combination with Encrypt-then-MAC as the connection’s encryption mode.

[…]

“So how practical is the attack?”

The Terrapin attack requires an active Man-in-the-Middle attacker, that means some way for an attacker to intercept and modify the data sent from the client or server to the remote peer. This is difficult on the Internet, but can be a plausible attacker model on the local network.

https://terrapin-attack.com/

That’s us.

Usually you can, though the setting might be listed under something like “show diagnostic during boot”.

As its name suggests, LogoFAIL involves logos, specifically those of the hardware seller that are displayed on the device screen early in the boot process, while the UEFI is still running. Image parsers in UEFIs from all three major IBVs are riddled with roughly a dozen critical vulnerabilities that have gone unnoticed until now. By replacing the legitimate logo images with identical-looking ones that have been specially crafted to exploit these bugs, LogoFAIL makes it possible to execute malicious code at the most sensitive stage of the boot process, which is known as DXE, short for Driver Execution Environment.

So, does disabling the boot logo prevent the attack, or would it only make the attack obvious?

Sysinternals Process Monitor can do boot logging.

This would fit perfectly on !risa@startrek.website